Recapturing the Reluctant Radical: how to win back Europe’s populist vote by Catherine Fieschi Marley Morris and Lila Caballero Read online

The Netherlands: the nostalgic radical

  What characterises the Dutch reluctant radical is nostalgia for a particular, Dutch version of consensus politics (orderly, implicitly codified, pillarised) – rooted in 19th and early 20th century Dutch politics – combined with disdain for the current political elite and an unresolved attitude towards minorities in the context of a fluid party system. Right-wing populism in the Netherlands is shaped by the particularities (and recent history) of the Dutch political system and context, and in part by the peculiarities of the PVV itself. Geert Wilders has capitalised on the antagonism towards foreigners, and this is reflected in the views of the reluctant radicals: 61 per cent of reluctant radicals oppose the immigration of Muslims, compared to 31 per cent of the total electorate. Ninety-one per cent of reluctant radicals in the Netherlands believe that immigrants should adapt to Dutch culture instead of keeping their own, compared to an average of 60 per cent.

  Both potential and reluctant radicals are disillusioned with the establishment, expressing low levels of trust in parliament. Political suspicion extends into wider social suspicion as well – only 49 per cent of reluctant radicals believe most people can be trusted, compared to an average of 64 per cent. As with France, committed radicals tend to decide who to vote for in advance of reluctant radicals.

  The education gap has become an important cleavage in the Netherlands. Potential, reluctant and committed PVV supporters are significantly more likely to be educated at a lower level than average. Only 10 per cent and 4 per cent of reluctant and committed radicals respectively have been to university (vocational or research), compared to 31 per cent of the whole electorate.

  Finland: the alienated radical

  An appetite for a different kind of politics and difficulties in processing the rapid transformation of Finland in the past two decades seems to define Finnish reluctant radicals. While reluctant and potential radicals in France and the Netherlands are strongly motivated by anti-immigration attitudes, in Finland it appears that different factors are at play. The most common reason the Finnish reluctant radicals give for voting for the True Finns is to bring political change. Those who attach importance to the issue of immigration tend instead to be the committed radicals.

  We find that the Finnish reluctant radicals tend to be working class and middle aged: 38 per cent identify as working class; 35 per cent are aged between 50 and 64, compared to 23 per cent of the whole electorate. We interpret the True Finns as the product of both a ‘crisis of modernity’ and, potentially, a ‘crisis of masculinity’ shaped by the particular Finnish context.

  1

  Why the reluctant radicals?

  The prevailing narrative

  In recent months, populism has filled the headlines. Politicians across Europe, faced with the crisis in the Eurozone, the elections in France and Greece and the tragic shootings in Utøya, have cautioned of a rise in the far right, extremism, and populism.1 Think tanks, academics and commentators have repeatedly shown alarm that the continuing economic crisis in Europe will soon be matched with a political nightmare.

  A common theme running through the commentary on right-wing populism is that a rise has been stimulated by the recession, the subsequent Eurozone crisis and severe austerity measures across Europe. Geopolitical intelligence company Stratfor commented that ‘times of austerity revive impulses toward nationalism and populism’.2 A New York Times article noted in passing that ‘As the downturn deepens across Europe, the political right has risen in several countries, including France, the Netherlands and Hungary’.3 Attempting to explain Marine Le Pen’s high score in the first round of the French presidential election, Tim Stanley in the Telegraph wrote that ‘Under economic stress, people are like rats in a cage – and what else can a panicked animal do except bite and tear at the soft meat around him?’ 4 Comparisons are made regularly with the 1930s and the rise of fascism. At times this has veered towards hysteria. One commentator earlier this year went as far as to say, ‘like vermin in a time of pestilence, neo-Nazi groups appear to be enjoying a resurgence in a Europe plagued by increasing financial chaos and uncertainty’.5

  Alongside this narrative a ‘typical profile’ of a right-wing populist party (RPP) supporter has emerged: young, often violent, poverty stricken and male. Reports of right-wing populism are regularly coupled with pictures of young men causing havoc. A number of reports and media outlets have caught young male right-wing populists in acts of violence: a Greek Golden Dawn spokesman slapping a female politician on live television;6 young men harassing Roma in the town of Gyöngyöspata in Hungary;7 English Defence League activists attending raucous demonstrations.8 A recent Guardian piece by Michael White lamenting the difficulties young military men face after leaving the armed forces drew further connections between extreme-right politics and troubled young men.9

  Some recent research has reinforced this image. Polling has shown that high numbers of young people are supportive of RPPs in France and Austria.10 The Demos report The New Face of Digital Populism showed that the online Facebook pages of right-wing populist movements across Europe are dominated by young men.11 In the UK, the image has been strengthened further by the anti-Islam English Defence League (EDL). By steering clear of the anti-Semitic and neo-fascist rhetoric of older forms of populism yet still maintaining strong associations with young male violence and football hooliganism, the EDL has given the impression that right-wing populism across Europe is the preserve of deprived and volatile young men.

  In this pamphlet we will examine this narrative in a number of ways. First, we will note that while right-wing populism continues to pose a threat to political stability, to minority groups and to the legitimacy of institutions, it is questionable whether it has risen across Europe since the Eurozone crisis. Second, we will argue that the discussion of right-wing populism should focus less on the committed extremists and more on the ‘reluctant radicals’ – those ‘soft’ supporters who are likely to be easier to bring back into mainstream politics. Third, we will critically test the profile of the ‘reluctant radicals’ as being young, impoverished and male.

  Before going further, we should briefly explain why we have chosen to use the word ‘right-wing populism’ in this pamphlet. Put simply, we think that the parties we are interested in are ‘right-wing’ by virtue of their belief in hierarchy and order. (This does not apply to their economic policies which, given Europe’s complicated relationship to liberal economics, may be, or appear, left-wing.) They are ‘populist’ by virtue of their militant anti-elitism, their glorification of ‘the people’, and their xenophobia.12 Some parties we include within this bracket – such as Golden Dawn – could be defined in stronger terms, such as ‘extreme-right’ or even ‘neo-Nazi’. By referring to the group as a whole as ‘right-wing populist’ we do not mean to dismiss the differences between the parties within the group or downplay the rhetoric and party programmes of the more extreme members. We use this term merely as a useful tool to talk about the group as a whole without assigning excessively heavy-duty labels such as ‘extreme-right’ to some parties. While Golden Dawn could be defined both as ‘extreme-right’ and ‘right-wing populist’, other parties such as UKIP or the True Finns could be named ‘right-wing populist’ but not legitimately be described as ‘extreme-right’. We wish to look at these parties too and so we use the term ‘right-wing populist’.

  Challenging the narrative

  The role of the recession and the financial crisis

  Our first step in investigating the prevailing narrative settles on the issue of whether it is the financial crisis, the recession and austerity that has provoked a rise in right-wing populism. It is clear why this view has become popular in some circles. The Front National (FN) scored its best ever result in the French presidential election under the leadership of Marine Le Pen and now has two deputies in the national assembly, the highest number since 1986. Against the expectations of many, the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn sustained its high score of 7 per cent in the second Greek national elections of 2012. In the Netherlands, PVV leader Geert Wilders confirmed the power of right-wing populism by bringing down the coalition government that he had previously supported. No wonder the European mainstream is concerned – the populist right appears to be stronger than ever.

  In fact, looking at the whole picture suggests this story is at best half-true. Yes, there have been some successes for right-wing populism since the financial crisis hit, notably in France, the Netherlands, Finland and Greece (though in France, Marine Le Pen’s score was only marginally higher than her father’s score in 2002, when Jean-Marie Le Pen’s vote was split between him and Bruno Mégret). But in other countries the populist right has struggled. In Italy, the Lega Nord have struggled in the wake of a party funding scandal followed by leader Umberto Bossi’s resignation.13 In the UK, the BNP has been hit by poor local election results, legal battles and lack of funding. In recent elections in Denmark, Norway and Switzerland, the right-wing populist vote has stagnated or fallen. Combined with the fact that many RPPs experienced some of their greatest periods of growth during times of economic prosperity – the Front National through the 1980s and 1990s, the FPÖ in 1999, and List Pim Fortuyn in 2002 – the evidence points to a picture that is more complex than a single comparison with the 1930s might suggest.14

  Recent changes in RPP support